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This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding on how inflation targets are 
set. For this reason, we first gather evidence from official central bank and 
government publications and from a questionnaire sent to central banks on how 
inflation targets are set; we then estimate the determinants of the level of inflation 
target in 19 inflation targeting countries using unbalanced panel interval regressions 
(to deal with the issue that targets are typically set as a range rather than as a point). 
Inflation targets are found to reflect macroeconomic fundamentals. Higher level as 
well as higher variability of inflation are associated with higher target. The setting 
of the inflation target is also found to have an important international dimension, as 
higher world inflation is positively correlated with inflation targets. Rapidly 
growing countries exhibit higher inflation targets. Our results also suggest that the 
larger width of inflation target is set in a more volatile macroeconomic 
environment. We find that central bank credibility is negatively associated with the 
level of inflation target, suggesting that less credible central banks are likely to 
recognize the risks related to anchoring inflation expectations at low levels. On the 
other hand, government party orientation does not matter even in less independent 
central banks.  
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1 Introduction 
Monetary policy transparency has increased substantially over the course of the last 10 to 20 years 
and the communication policies of central banks have changed dramatically (Blinder et al., 2009, 
Crowe and Meade, 2008, Dincer and Eichengreen, 2010). While some central banks did not even 
announce changes in their monetary policy rate in the 1980s, they now provide detailed 
information about their monetary policy conduct and find transparency as important factor for 
building central bank credibility in order to manage inflation expectations more effectively (van 
der Cruijsen and  Demertzis, 2007).  
 
More than 20 countries adopted an inflation targeting regime in the 1990s and 2000s. A 
characteristic feature of this monetary policy regime is an explicit numerical target for inflation, as 
well as a high degree of accountability and transparency and a major role for inflation forecast in 
monetary policy conduct due to lags in monetary transmission (see Walsh, 2009 and Svensson, 
2010 for a recent survey on inflation targeting). Nevertheless, as we find, the amount of 
information that central banks provide about how one of their most important policy variables – 
the inflation target – is set varies considerably. While some central banks provide very detailed 
statements, others do not give any explanation for the process of inflation target setting and 
merely state the numerical target. Similarly, the academic community has extensively examined 
the effect of inflation targeting on various macroeconomic variables, but the inflation target 
setting process is virtually untouched.  
 
Economic models consider inflation targets an exogenous factor, but inflation targets differ from 
country to country. While the Reserve Bank of Australia specifies its inflation target between 2-
3%, the Bank of England defines its target as 2% with +/- 1 percentage point tolerance band and 
the Bank of Thailand targets inflation between 0-3.5%. In addition, there are countries that 
implement an inflation targeting regime as a disinflation strategy. For example, the Central Bank 
of Brazil adopted this regime in 1999 with the target of 8% with +/- 2 percentage point tolerance 
interval and decreased the target step by step to 4.5% (with +/- 2 percentage point tolerance 
interval). Similarly, the Bank of Israel started with a 14-15% target in 1992 and then decided on a 
downward path for inflation targets at the end with a 1-3% inflation target.  
 
We aim to bridge the gap in the literature by analyzing which factors matter for the apparent 
heterogeneity in inflation target setting. First, we analyze official central bank and government 
documents together with the answers to our questionnaire on inflation target setting that was   2
sent to all central banks in our sample in order to shed light on which factors are deemed crucial 
by central bankers in their considerations about inflation targets. Second, we construct an 
empirical model to investigate the determinants of inflation targets as well as the width of the 
inflation target. While official central bank documents provide useful guidance on which factors 
are likely to influence the inflation target setting, we also aim to investigate whether there are 
some additional, predominantly institutional, factors that matter for the process of setting the 
target. For example, we examine whether central banks that are viewed as less credible feature a 
higher inflation target in order to decrease the risk that they will not be able to meet the target, as 
they manage inflation expectations less effectively or whether central bank independence matters 
to the process of inflation target setting. 
 
Anticipating our results, we find that not only are macroeconomic fundamentals important for 
the level of inflation targets, but some institutional characteristics are as well. Notably, our results 
stress the importance of central bank credibility in delivering low inflation (see Blinder, 2000, for 
supporting evidence based on surveys): we find credibility to be negatively correlated with the 
level of inflation target. On the other hand, government party orientation is not found to matter 
even in less independent central banks. This likely reflects the fact that inflation targeters typically 
exhibit a high degree of independence already before the adoption of an inflation targeting 
regime and a sufficient degree of independence is viewed as one of the pre-conditions for 
successful adoption of inflation targeting (Amato and Gerlach, 2002). Finally, our results also 
suggest that central banks set a larger width of inflation target in a more volatile macroeconomic 
environment.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed overview of what central banks 
say about inflation target setting. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methodology. We 
present our results in section 4. Concluding remarks are provided in section 5. An Appendix with 
additional descriptive statistics and regression results follow. 
 
2 What Do Central Banks Say about Inflation Targets? 
This section presents a brief survey of central bank official publications related to the setting of 
inflation targets and summarizes the results of the short questionnaire on inflation target setting 
that we sent to all central banks in our sample in March 2010. The amount of information that 
central banks provide in their official publications varies bank by bank. Some banks explain how   3
the target is set in detail. On the other hand, other central banks in our sample remain largely 
silent on this issue and merely state the numerical target without further comment.  
 
Table 1 displays the information on which authority is responsible for inflation target setting as 
well as information on the factors that central banks find important for setting the inflation 
target. Although the degree of goal independence of central banks the inflation target is 
predominantly set by the central bank and government jointly. Central banks frequently state that 
past domestic inflation as well as economic growth matter in considering how to set the target. 
Several central banks mention more specific factors such as price convergence or zero interest 
rate bound. Detailed information on what central banks state about inflation target setting is 
provided in the Appendix. 
 
Based on the results of our questionnaire as well as official central bank publications, it seems 
that economic variables play a role in setting the target. It is typically (domestic and foreign) 
inflation rate, stability of the macroeconomic environment, and the degree of economic activity 
that are mentioned. Sometimes, price convergence and statistical overvaluation in inflation 
measurement is noted. As regards the latter, central banks refer to it as one of the factors for 
targeting positive inflation. In the following sections, we  investigate empirically whether these 
factors contribute to inflation target setting. We also examine a broader set of indicators, 
especially those related to the institutional setting of central banks, i.e. indicators such as central 
bank credibility or central bank independence, since the government participates in inflation 
target setting in most countries in our sample.  
   4
Table  1: Inflation Target Setting and Its Determinants 
     Country  Who sets the target?  Determinants of inflation targets 
Australia    Central bank and 
government jointly 
Business cycle fluctuations  
Brazil    Central bank and 
government jointly 
 n.a. 
Canada    Central bank and 
government jointly 
Costs of inflation, Measurement error, Wage 
rigidities, Zero interest rate bound 
Chile   Central bank  Deflation risk 
Colombia    Central bank and 
government jointly 
  n.a. 
Czech Republic  Central bank  Past  inflation, Inflation expectations, Price 
convergence, Wage rigidities, Zero interest rate 
bound, Measurement error 
Finland    Central bank and 
government jointly 
n.a. 
Israel   Government  Measurement error, Wage and price rigidities, 
Zero interest rate bound 
Mexico   Central bank   Foreign inflation 
New Zealand   Central  bank  and 
government jointly 
Past Inflation, Foreign Inflation, Target 
Expectations  
Peru    Central bank and 
government jointly 
n.a. 
Poland    Central bank and 
government jointly 
Economic growth, Maastricht inflation criterion 
for euro adoption 
South Africa   Central bank    n.a. 
South Korea   Central  bank  and 
government jointly 
Past inflation, Economic fundamentals, 
Monetary policy flexibility 
Spain    Central bank and 
government jointly 
n.a. 
Sweden    Central  bank  Past inflation, Costs of inflation, Risks of 
deflation, Measurement error  
Switzerland   Central bank  Measurement Error  
Thailand    Central bank and 
government jointly 
Foreign inflation, Economic growth  
United 
Kingdom 
Government Sustainable  growth 
Source: The column ‘Who sets the target?’ is based on our questionnaire sent to central banks in March 2010,  
Mahadeva and Sterne (2000), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Baltensperger et al. (2007). The column 
‘Determinants of inflation targets’ is based on our questionnaire sent to central banks in March 2010, various central 
bank official publications and web pages. 
 
3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
We collect the data from 19 countries targeting inflation, each series covering the period from the 
year when the country adopted the inflation targeting regime until 2008.
1 As a result, our panel is 
                                                 
1 More specifically: Australia (1994-2008), Brazil (1999-2008), Canada (1991-2008), Chile (1991-2008), Colombia 
(1999-2008), Czech Republic (1998-2008), Finland (1993-1998), Israel (1992-2008), Mexico (1999-2008), New 
Zealand (1990-2008), Peru (1994-2008), Poland (1999-2008), South Africa (2000-2008), South Korea (1998-2008),   5
unbalanced. The cross-sectional dimension of our data matrix is the same as in Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), but more recent data on these countries are included as well. Several 
developing countries that adopted inflation targeting only recently are thus not included, as the 
time coverage is too short. Our sample consists of developed as well as emerging economies. 
Yearly data are used, as inflation targets do not change more frequently. The current inflation 
targets are presented in Figure 1. 
 














































































































































Note: The figure presents the annual inflation target for our sample countries (Finland and Spain are not reported, as 
they do not target inflation any longer and currently, they are members of the euro area). 
 
A vast majority of countries revise their inflation targets from time to time and inflation targets 
are typically defined in terms of range with or without some central value. Central banks evaluate 
inflation to be consistent with their inflation target, if it develops within the target band. For this 
reason, we employ panel interval regression with random effects, where the dependent variable is 
defined as an interval (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Moreover, this technique also deals with the 
issue that the dependent variable is censored. For robustness checks, we use a target midpoint
2 as 
the dependent variable and estimate the standard random effects model. Nevertheless, it is 
important to emphasize that in this case the analysis would not reflect uncertainty concerning the 
nature of the exact values within each interval correctly, nor would it deal adequately with the 
left- and right-censoring.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Spain (1996-1998), Sweden (1995-2008), Switzerland (2000-2008), Thailand (2000-2008), United Kingdom (1992-
2008). 
2 Some central banks specify only a target band and do not provide a central target (see Figure 1). In this case, we 
calculate the mid-point of the target band. The regression results are largely in line with baseline estimates and are 
available upon request.   6
Our baseline empirical model takes the following general form 
 


















t i   are inflation target lower and upper bounds, respectively, in country i 
and time t.  1 ,  t i X  is a vector of explanatory variables in country i and time  1  t . Finally,   is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated and  t i,   is a residual. 
 
In our baseline model, the explanatory variables are lagged by one period to deal with potential 
endogeneity. This is adequate in our view, as there is evidence that inflation targets have an effect 
on at least some of our explanatory variables.
3 Many central banks, especially those which 
adopted inflation targeting as a disinflation strategy such as Colombia and Peru as well as Israel, 
Korea, Chile or Mexico in the past set their inflation target one year ahead. In the UK, the 
government’s inflation target is announced each year by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 
annual Budget statement. Nevertheless, other central banks announce the target more years in 
advance. For example, the Central Bank of Brazil announced its target several times two years in 
advance. To deal with this issue, we re-estimate all regressions with explanatory variables lagged 
by two as well as three periods. In addition, we estimate our empirical model based on the 
restricted sample, where we include only those countries in those time periods for which we 
know the exact date when the decision about inflation target was made and when it came into 
effect. The lag of explanatory variables is thus time and country specific in the ‘Exact lag’ model, 
i.e. the lag exactly conforms to the announcement of the target and makes it fully robust to the 
endogeneity concerns.  
 
Our explanatory variables,  1 ,  t i X , are, to a certain extent, motivated by the findings of Section 2. 
These are typically variables capturing the state of the economy such as inflation or the degree of 
economic activity. In addition, we include variables that are deemed to influence central bank 
                                                 
3 The empirical literature typically analyzes the impact of introducing inflation targeting on other macroeconomic 
variables (such as: development of actual and expected inflation, and GDP) or their characteristics (such as volatility 
or persistence of inflation). Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006), for example, have analyzed the impact of inflation 
targeting on the level of inflation, as well as intensity of inflation response to various shocks. Levin et al. (2004), Vega 
and Winkelried (2005) and Yigit (2007) have examined whether introducing an inflation target has lowered the 
persistence and volatility of inflation. Johnson (2002, 2003), de Mello and Moccero (2006) and Cerisola and Gelos 
(2009) have evaluated the inflation target impact on the level of expected inflation. Babecky et al. (2009) and Franta 
et al. (2007) have inter alia analyzed the impact of introducing the inflation target on inflation persistence. Demir and 
Yigit (2008) find that inflation targeting matters for central bank credibility.   7
policies in general such as the institutional setup of the central bank, i.e. whether the banks are 
granted independence or how credible their policies are perceived by the public.  
 
Next, we provide a full list of our explanatory variables,  1 ,  t i X . These are both variables capturing 




Consumer price index inflation measured as year-on-year change is included in order to assess 
whether the central bankers take into account past inflation developments when setting the 
target. We hypothesize that higher inflation is associated with a higher inflation target. This can 
be so as central bankers may believe that inflation expectations are at least to a certain extent 
formed by past inflation.




As a measure for inflation volatility (being of utmost importance in the debate about optimal 
inflation, see Billi and Kahn, 2008) we use the sample variance of past detrended inflation record. 
Inflation is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter in order to reflect the fact that some 
countries adopted the inflation target as a disinflation strategy and experienced a higher inflation 
rate for some parts of our sample. For sensitivity analysis, we also calculate inflation volatility 
based on inflation series that are not detrended.
5 As we expect that policymakers who decide the 
inflation target value more recent developments, we make an average of sample variances in the 
past 5 and 10 years (where the inflation measures π are already Hodrick-Prescott-detrended).   
























t var                            (2) 
The choice of 5 and 10 years is somewhat arbitrary, but alternative specifications such as a simple 
10 year sample variance resulted in a largely similar estimated effect of inflation volatility on 
inflation target in our econometric exercises. The source of data is the IFS database of the 
International Monetary Fund. 
                                                 
4 We prefer actual inflation to inflation expectations data, which are typically based on surveys due to data availability 
as well as to the fact that the accuracy of expectations data may be an issue; see Caskey (1985), Evans and Gulamani 
(1984), Jeong and Maddala (1996), Evans and Honkapohja, (2001), among others. Note that the inflation measure 
includes the measurement error of inflation and there are no reliable estimates of the measurement error to model 
the effect of this error separately from inflation. 
5 Nevertheless, our regression results are largely unchanged irrespective of the measure of inflation volatility we use.   8
 
World inflation 
We also use world CPI inflation, as central banks especially in small open economies may 
understand world inflation as a certain leading indicator for domestic inflation. This supposition 
is supported by recent empirical evidence from Mojon and Cicarelli (2010), who document that 
nearly 70% of variance of inflation in OECD countries is due to common shocks. The source of 
data is the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
 
Price level 
We include the price level measured by PPP to test the hypothesis of price convergence: Do 
countries with a lower price level set a higher inflation target to reflect the expected price 
convergence towards more developed countries? Price level may also serve as an useful indicator 
to assess if inflation target are set differently in emerging market countries. The source of this 
data is the Penn World Table. 
 
GDP per capita 
Similarly to the price level, GDP per capita is included to investigate whether inflation targets are 
higher in poorer countries. Poorer countries also tend to have a more volatile macroeconomic 
environment (as financial markets are typically underdeveloped, see Coricelli and Roland, 2008) 
and central bankers are more likely set to wider tolerance intervals for inflation target. 
Alternatively, we use a dummy for emerging market economies instead of GDP per capita. The 
source of data is the IFS database of the International Monetary Fund. 
 
GDP growth 
We hypothesize that a higher inflation target is set in fast-growing economies, as these countries 
typically exhibit higher inflation at least in the short and medium-term (this can be rationalized by 
the New Keynesian Phillips curve, see Gali and Gertler, 1999).  The source of data is the IFS 
database of the International Monetary Fund. 
 
Credibility 
Central bank credibility is likely to affect the formation of inflation expectations. Private sector 
long-term inflation expectations are found to give greater weight to inflation target under a 
credible central bank (Bomfim and Rudebush, 2000). Typically, credibility is defined as the 
difference between inflation target and inflation expectations (Svensson, 1999). Blinder (2000)   9
also argues that the difference between inflation target and inflation expectations can be taken as 
an objective measure of central bank credibility.
6 For this reason, we use the cross-sectional index 
of central bank credibility developed by Cecchetti and Krause (2002). The credibility index has no 
time-series dimension, so it will only serve to explain cross-country variation. This might be 
sufficient for our empirical exercise as central bank credibility is unlikely to change abruptly over 
time (Holub and Hurnik, 2008). The index is based on the data before the inflation targeting was 
introduced in our sample countries. We hypothesize that more credible central banks, especially 
those in developed countries, can manage inflation expectations more effectively and set inflation 
targets below the targets typical for emerging market economies. 
 
Central bank independence 
Less independent central banks may be more prone to government influence and, knowing that 
they are likely to deliver higher inflation, may eventually prefer a higher inflation target (see 
Siklos, 2008, for a recent survey of theories and empirical evidence on central bank independence 
and inflation). There are various measures of central bank independence and various studies 
cover different sets of countries (for a survey of central bank independence measures see Arnone 
et al., 2006). Cukierman (1992) sets up a central bank independence (CBI) index, which is a 
composite measure based on both legal and real indicators. We use several recently developed 
CBI indexes that build on the original Cukierman (1992) contribution. First, we employ the 
central bank autonomy index by Arnone et al. (2008), who developed the index for a large group 
of central banks for the late 1980s and 2003. We use the index only for 2003, as our sample 
countries adopted an inflation targeting regime later than in the 1980s. The Arnone et al. (2008) 
index distinguishes between political (goal) and economic (instrument) independence. Political 
independence refers to the extent to which the central bank can set the objective of monetary 
policy, while economic independence refers to the degree of freedom the central bank has in 
selecting its instruments. Arnone et al. (2008) show that political and economic independence can 
differ sharply for certain central banks; we therefore examine the impact of political and 
economic central bank independence jointly as well as separately. Alternatively, we also use data 
from Guillén and Polillo (2005), who extend the Cukierman central bank independence index up 
to 2000 and their country coverage is comprehensive. Their measure is time-varying and more 
recent data that are not available are extrapolated using the last observation in each country. 
                                                 
6 The difference between inflation expectations and inflation target is likely to be a better indicator of credibility than 
the difference between actual inflation and inflation target. Short-term developments in inflation are influenced, to a 
certain extent, by temporary shocks, while long-term inflation expectations are likely to be immune to the short-term 
disturbances. For instance, Holub and Hurnik (2008) document that although inflation targets were missed relatively 
often in the Czech Republic, inflation expectations remained anchored, i.e. close to the inflation target.   10
 
Government party orientation 
Finally, we include a measure of government party orientation. In principle, government may 
influence the setting of the inflation target, as the targets are typically set based on a joint 
agreement between central bank and government. In some countries such as the United 
Kingdom it is the government who sets the target and the central bank does not have goal 
independence. We hypothesize that left-leaning governments favor greater expenditures and 
higher inflation (Hibbs, 1977, Alesina, 1988) and in consequence, may support higher inflation 
targets. The data are taken from the World Development Indicators database. The variable is 
coded is follows: -1 for left wing (UK labour, US democratic), 0 for center and other orientation, 
1 for right wing (UK conservative, US republican).  
 
Because government party orientation may be more influential in less independent central banks, 
we construct an additional interaction term capturing the joint effect of government party 
orientation and central bank independence. As we work with two different indexes of 
independence, we consequently have two corresponding measures of joint effect of government 
party orientation and independence. Moreover, for the Arnone et al. (2008) index we are also able 
to distuinguish political and economic central bank independence. In this respect, Alesina, 
Roubini and Cohen (1997), Boix (2000), Clark (2003), Sakamoto (2008) and Belke and Potrafke 
(2009) study whether government party orientation matters for interest rate setting in less 
independent central banks. Their research shows that party orientation is of limited importance 
probably due to the high degree of central bank independence. In contrast to these studies, we 
examine the effect of government party orientation on setting the inflation target and also 
distinguish between political and economic central bank independence, as political independence 
can clearly be more relevant in our case. The scatter plots of inflation target (central value) and 
explanatory variables are presented in Figures 2 and 3 in the Appendix. 
 
4 Results 
We present our baseline estimates in Table 2 and focus in detail on the effects of central bank 
independence in Table 3. The results unambiguously suggest that actual inflation rate matters for 
the setting of inflation targets. Similarly, policy makers also take the variability of inflation into 
account and set higher targets in an environment with more volatile inflation. This likely reflects 
their concerns about deflation risk. Alternative measures of inflation variability yield largely 
similar results (these are available upon request). The degree of economic activity is also found to   11
matter. Higher growth is likely to go hand-in-hand with higher inflation at least in the short to 
medium-term horizon. This corresponds to the reasoning based on the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve. Higher world inflation delivers higher inflation targets, as policy makers recognize that a 
substantial part of the price index is often driven by world prices. This finding conforms with 
Cicarelli and Mojon (2010), who document the prominent role of global inflation for domestic 
inflation developments in the OECD countries.  
 
The results indicate that central bank credibility influences the level of inflation target. This is 
probably so, as less credible central banks (i.e. those with a less impressive track record) may be 
more concerned about their ability to anchor the inflation expectations of the public and thus 
prefer a higher target. This corrensponds to the findings of Blinder (2000), whose survey 
indicates that central bankers recognize credibility as a very important factor for maintaining low 
inflation. Similarly, more credible central banks can set a lower target during disinflation with the 
same output loss (Nikolae and Nolan, 2006).  
 
On the other hand, although some central banks mention price convergence as a factor for the 
choice of inflation target (see Table 1), we do not find it to be a general phenomenon. Neither 
central bank independence nor government party orientation is found to influence the level of 
inflation targets. As Belke and Potrafke (2009) note, government party orientation may still 
matter for the interest rate setting process if the degree of central bank independence is low. 
Therefore, we construct an interaction term of government party orientation and central bank 
independence, but like Belke and Potrafke (2009) we fail to find it significant. 
    12
Table 2: Determinants of Inflation Targets     
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)
CPI inflation    0.50***  0.49*** 0.55*** 0.49*** 0.49***   0.49***  0.50***
   (15.75)    (14.47)  (15.83) (15.15) (15.05)      (15.47)   (15.55) 
Inflation volatility    0.29**  0.29*** 0.23*** 0.23***  0.24***    0.22***   0.31*** 
   (2.61)    (2.46)  (2.67) (2.64) (2.68)    (2.51)   (2.71) 
GDP growth    0.15***  0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15***   0.15***  0.16***
   (3.96)    (3.76) (4.11) (3.77) (3.77)    (3.75)   (4.03) 
World inflation    0.12**  0.11* 0.13** 0.13** 0.13**   0.12**  0.11*
   (2.13)    (1.75)  (2.29) (2.19) (2.24)    (2.15)   (1.91) 
Credibility    -0.51**   -0.53*  -0.49** -0.58**  -0.60**    -0.48   -0.65**
   (-2.21)   (-1.76)  (-2.13)  (-2.30)  (-2.39)    (-1.56)   (-2.15) 
Price level     -0.01   
     (-0.16)  
Independence     -0.50   
     (-1.01)  
Gov. party orientation      -0.07  
     (-0.66)  
(Independence + Gov. p. or.)    -0.09    
     (-0.68)    
GDP per capita    -2.50 
   (-0.19) 
Emerging markets dummy     -0.19
     (-0.73)
    
Constant   0.63*  0.76* 0.88** 0.66** 0.72** 0.65* 0.77**
   (1.95)    (1.86)  (2.16) (2.03) (2.13)   (1.86) (2.04)
No. of observations   134  114  130 130  130   130  130
Pseudo R-squared 0.78  0.80 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.77
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Panel interval random effects estimation. Inflation volatility, GDP per capita and price level coefficient 
premultiplied by 106 and 103, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period. Independence refers to the central bank independence index developed by Arnone et al. (2008).  
 
Next, we examine if inflation target setting is different in emerging countries (i.e. those countries 
that often implemented inflation targeting as a disinflation strategy), proxied by GDP per capita. 
GDP per capita may be preferable to a dummy for emerging countries, as it gives richer 
information on the state of economic development (the group of emerging market economies is 
rather heterogeneous; for example, Israel is often considered an emerging economy, but its GDP 
per capita is at the level of industrialized countries, while some countries that are typically 
regarded as emerging economies have a GDP per capita about ten times lower than Israel not far 
from the levels of some developing countries). The results suggest that although the inflation 
targets are typically higher in emerging countries, the inflation target setting process is largely 
similar. This is also confirmed by the regression in Table 2, column 7, where we use the dummy 
for emerging market economies instead.  
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Table 3: Determinants of Inflation Targets: 
Different Measures of Central Bank Independence     
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
CPI inflation    0.50*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49***  0.50***   0.50***
   (15.97) (15.66) (15.01) (15.10)   (15.71)    (15.07) 
Inflation volatility    0.29*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31***  0.23***   0.23*** 
   (2.56) (2.51) (2.75) (2.68)   (2.57)    (2.65) 
GDP growth    0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***  0.16***   0.15***
   (4.17) (3.96) (3.73) (3.79)   (4.02)    (3.85) 
World inflation    0.13** 0.12** 0.13** 0.13**  0.11**   0.12**
   (2.30) (2.12) (2.28) (2.218)   (1.96)    (2.00) 
Credibility    -0.49**  -0.51**  -0.63** -0.56**  -0.44    -0.54** 
   (-2.14)  (-2.12)  (-2.50)  (-2.29)   (-1.57)    (-1.97) 
Independence 1  -0.45  
(Arnone et al.  index – political part)  (-1.51)  
Independence 2    0.01  
(Arnone et al.  index – economic part)   (0.02)  
(Independence 1 + Gov. p. or.)    -0.13  
   (-1.21)  
(Independence 2 + Gov. p. or.)    -0.06  
   (-0.64)  
Independence 3     0.11  
(Guillén and Polillo index)     (0.21)   
(Independence 3 + Gov. p. or.)      -0.05
     (-0.50)
    
Constant   0.77** 0.62 0.74** 0.71**  0.55    0.70**
   (2.34) (1.23) (2.23) (2.205)   (1.09)    (2.01) 
No. of observations   130  130 130  130   123    123
Pseudo R-squared 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Panel interval random effects estimation. Inflation volatility, GDP per capita and price level coefficient 
premultiplied by 106 and 103, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period. 
 
A large body of research has focused on the effect of central bank independence on inflation 
performance (see Klomp and de Haan, 2010, for a quantitative survey of this issue). Although 
there is a lively debate and empirical results are to a certain degree mixed, the literature puts 
forward that central bank independence is negatively associated with inflation. As Siklos (2008) 
points out that no single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries at all 
times, we use various measures of central bank independence to provide more robust evidence 
on the effect of independence on inflation targets. As noted in the data description we employ 
the Arnone et al. (2008) and Guillén and Polillo (2005) measures of independence that have 
appropriate country and time coverage for us. Our results suggest that central bank independence 
does not matter for inflation targets in our sample. This finding, however, may be driven by the 
fact that sufficient central bank independence is, in general, one of the pre-conditions for the 
adoption of inflation targeting (Amato and Gerlach, 2002) and that the degree of central bank 
independence is thus typically high in inflation targeting countries. We also interact central bank   14
independence indexes with government party orientation (as government party orientation would 
play a role possibly in the case of less dependent central banks) and fail to find any systematic 
role for government interference, despite it mostly being the case that central banks do not have 
full goal independence and set the inflation target jointly with the government. 
 
Finally, we also examine the determinants of the width of inflation target. Typically, central banks 
set the point inflation target with a tolerance band of +/- 1 percentage point. Nevertheless, some 
central banks such as the Bank of Korea have chosen narrower tolerance bands, while others 
such as the Central Bank of Brazil set the tolerance bands at a wider range. As we have seen in 
Section 2, central banks note the volatility of the macroeconomic environment as a factor they 
consider when setting the width of their target. Indeed, our results, as presented in Table 4, 
indicate that controlling for other factors, the volatility of the macroeconomic environment 
together with the level of inflation is likely to be the primary cause for the width of the target. We 
find that inflation volatility is positively associated with the width of the inflation target. 
Additional evidence for the supposition that the volatility of the macroeconomic environment 
matters is that the width of the inflation target is greater in emerging market economies (i.e. those 
countries that typically exhibit a more volatile environment).  
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Table 4: Determinants of Inflation Target Band Width 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI inflation  0.03***  0.03***  0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
  (3.13) (3.00) (3.32) (3.13) (2.84) (3.04) 
Inflation volatility  0.01*  0.01*  0.01  0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
  (1.77) (1.76) (1.60) (1.70) (1.95) (1.78) 
Credibility 0.35  0.35 0.64 0.35 0.86  1.05** 
  (0.69) (0.70) (1.34) (0.66) (1.57) (1.99) 
World inflation    -0.01         
   (-0.11)        
Price level      -0.01       
     (-1.35)      
GDP  growth      0.02    
      (0.15)    
GDP  per  capita       -35.2**   
       (-2.03)   
Emerging  markets  dummy        0.91** 
        (2.13) 
        
Constant 1.70***  1.70*** 1.93*** 1.69*** 1.93*** 1.00*** 
  (5.13) (5.16) (5.31) (4.86) (5.72) (2.32) 
Observations  139 139 124 139 139 139 
R-squared 0.08  0.08 0.15 0.08 0.19 0.20 
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Inflation volatility and GDP per capita coefficient premultiplied by 106. T-statistics in parentheses. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Random effects estimation. 
 
We also conduct further robustness checks. First, our inflation volatility measure is based on 
inflation, rather than detrended inflation as in our baseline model. Second, we lag all explanatory 
variables by two periods to reflect the fact the inflation targets in some countries are set two years 
ahead. The results, which are available in Table A1-A6 in the Appendix, largely support our 
baseline estimates to a large extent.  
 
In addition, we also estimate the model with explanatory variables lagged by three periods. The 
results remain largely unchanged and are available upon request. Finally, we estimate our 
empirical model based on a restricted sample, where we include in the data matrix only those 
countries in those time periods for which we know the exact date when the decision about 
inflation target was made and when it came into effect. The lag of explanatory variables is thus 
time and country specific, i.e. the lag exactly conforms to the difference between the 
announcement of the target and when the target becomes effective. While this approach tackles 
endogeneity well, the disadvantage is that the sample size is reduced by about one third. Despite 
the lower number of observations, these regressions largely confirm our previous findings. The 
results are available is Table A7 in the Appendix. Inflation as well as GDP growth is again a 
robust determinant of inflation targets. The degree of central bank credibility is negatively   16
associated with the level of inflation targets. Although the world inflation and inflation variability 
keep their expected signs, they are no longer significant at conventional levels (even though 
world inflation is statistically significant in one specification and its p-values are about 0.15 in the 
remaining specifications). All in all, the sensitivity analysis largely supports our baseline estimates. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we analyze how inflation targets are set. Despite its high policy relevance, this issue 
is virtually untouched by the academic community. This is despite the fact that more and more 
countries have adopted an inflation targeting regime and inflation targets sometimes differ largely 
among countries. First, we gather evidence on what central banks and government publications 
say about how inflation targets are set. We complement this with the findings of a questionnaire 
on how inflation targets are set that was sent to all central banks in our sample. Second, we 
provide panel interval regressions to shed light on which factors matter for the setting of inflation 
targets.  
 
We find that higher level as well as higher variability of inflation makes central banks set higher 
targets. The setting of the inflation target is found to have an important international dimension, 
as higher world inflation is positively correlated with inflation targets. Rapidly growing countries 
exhibit higher inflation targets. Our results also suggest that central banks set a larger width of 
inflation target in a more volatile macroeconomic environment.    
 
Next, central bank credibility is negatively associated with the level of inflation target, suggesting 
that less credible central banks recognize the risks of anchoring inflation expectations at low 
levels. This corrensponds to the findings of Blinder (2000), whose survey indicates that central 
bankers recognize credibility as very important in order to keep low inflation. On the other hand, 
government party orientation does not matter even in less independent central banks. This likely 
reflects the fact that inflation targeters typically exhibit a high degree of independence already 
before the adoption of an inflation targeting regime and a sufficient degree of independence is 
viewed as one of the pre-conditions for successful adoption of inflation targeting. 
 
In terms of future research, we believe it would be vital to analyze inflation targets on a 
theoretical grounds and to clarify the links between optimal inflation and inflation target.    17
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Appendix 
 
Statements of central banks on how inflation targets are set 
 
Bank of Canada 
The bank notes that inflation is typically not targeted close to zero for three main reasons: “(i) the 
measurement error embedded in existing price indexes; (ii) the labour market consequences of the presence of 
downward nominal wage rigidities; and (iii) the problems posed by the constraint that nominal interest rates cannot 
go below zero.”  (see http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/press/background_nov06.pdf). 
 
Bank of England 
The bank states that the inflation target is chosen to be consistent with economic stability and 
growth: ”the role of price stability in achieving economic stability more generally, and in providing the right 
conditions for sustainable growth in output and employment.”  
(see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/framework.htm). 
 
Bank of Israel 
The banks gives several arguments for how the target is chosen: ”the aberration in measuring inflation 
that stems from not taking into account the improvement in quality of goods; a positive inflation reduces the risk of 
being constrained by the zero bound on nominal interest rates; a small inflation rate is the oil in the wheels of the 
relative price system––when there is a general upward trend in prices it is easier to change relative prices of goods by 
raising prices by more or less than the general rate of inflation”. Next, it is also noted that: “When both prices 
and wages are sticky downwards, lowering a relative price could be delayed and thus cause distortion in the 
allocation of resources. We have no basis to think that in Israel one of these factors is any different from that in 
other developed countries” (see Bank of Israel, 2007, page 19). 
 
Bank of Korea 
The Bank of Korea states that : "In setting the inflation target itself at the range of 3.0 0.5%, the Bank 
aims to reflect the appropriate rate of inflation consistent with Korean economic fundamentals and to allow itself 
flexibility in conducting monetary policy to deal with short-term economic fluctuations." 
(http://www.bok.or.kr/broadcast.action?menuNaviId=631). This suggest that inflation as well as 
the degree of economic activity has come into considerations when setting the inflation target.  
 
Bank of Poland   22
The bank states in the document on their monetary policy strategy that the target is chosen to be 
consistent with economic growth as well as with Maastricht inflation criterion for euro adoption: 
”the above-defined continuous inflation target is consistent with strong economic growth. At the same time, the 
predefined inflation target comes close to the expected reference value for the inflation criterion” (Bank of Poland, 
2003). 
 
Bank of Thailand 
The Bank of Thailand states that “The Monetary Policy Committee considers the 0 - 3.5 per cent target 
range for core inflation to be appropriate for the Thai economy, while at the same time providing sufficient 
flexibility for economic growth“. The Bank of Thailand also describes explicitly the width of the target: 
"The target band width of 3.5 per cent will help cushion temporary economic shocks and minimize the need for the 
MPC to adjust monetary policy frequently, thereby reducing short-term interest rate volatility and promoting 
financial stability." (see 
http://www.bot.or.th/ENGLISH/MONETARYPOLICY/TARGET/Pages/Target.aspx). This 
suggests that the degree of economic activity may potentially act as a determinant of inflation 
target. As concerns the determinants of target band width, the volatility of the macroeconomic 
environment is likely to be positively associated with the width. 
 
Central Bank of Chile 
The bank notes that the inflation target is set in order to avoid the risk of deflation: ” The Central 
Bank of Chile does not aim for an inflation level below the specified range because of the risk of deflation, which 
could be very costly in terms of employment and production” (see 
http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/about/functions/05.htm). 
 
Czech National Bank 
The Czech National Bank provides an extensive explanation about how the target is set. The 
Bank has revised the target several times from its introduction in 1998 in order to support the 
disinflation process (Holub and Hurnik, 2008). Initially, the CNB states: ``The long-term inflation 
target must be consistent with the strategy for our integration into European institutions, and above all with the 
demands of EU and EMU accession`` and ``the rate of progress towards price and monetary stability and the 
anticipated time horizon for achieving this must take into account necessary structural adaptations, particularly the 
adjustment of relative prices.'' (CNB, 1999). Current and expected inflation as well as general 
macroeconomic environment are mentioned as determinants: ``The inflation target for 2001 reflects 
the low inflation level achieved so far and expresses the monetary policy intention to maintain this low level in the   23
next period. The target level is in line with the predictions for inflation factors in 2001 and conforms with the 
inflation expectations of economic agents. The forecasts also indicate that this inflation target is consistent with the 
expected favourable characteristics of the Czech macroeconomic environment.'' (CNB, 2000). Next, price 
convergence towards the euro area is noted as a reason for higher inflation target, as compared to 
the definition of price stability of the European Central Bank: ``The suggested headline inflation target 
is in line with the CNB Monetary Strategy. ... The proposed trajectory for the inflation target can meanwhile be 
expected to leave sufficient room for price adjustment in connection with EU convergence.'' (CNB, 2001). 
Similarly : ``This small inflation differential reflects the long-term real convergence of the Czech economy towards 
the euro area average.” (CNB, 2004). More recently, statistical overvaluation in measuring inflation, 
wage rigidity, and zero nominal interest rate bound are explicitly mentioned as factors taken into 
account: ``The inflation target ... also conforms to the limitations stemming from statistical overvaluation in 
measuring inflation. The target takes into account also the zero nominal interest rate bound and the potential 
downward inflexibility of wages.'' Finally, the target for 2010 onwards is set to 2% with a 1% tolerance 
band. The determinants mentioned are the same as in previous cases: ``the need to keep open a 
positive inflation differential as one of the channels for raising the Czech price level to the level of the advanced 
countries will gradually subside.'' (CNB, 2007). 
 
Reserve Bank of Australia 
In a series of statements on the conduct of monetary policy, the bank’s formulation of inflation 
target is noted: “ allows for the natural short-run variation in inflation over the cycle while preserving a clearly 
identifiable performance benchmark over time “. 
(http://www.rba.gov.au/MonetaryPolicy/statement_conduct_mp_4_06122007.html) 
 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand provides the following arguments about how the inflation 
target is chosen: "The agreement [about inflation target] is broadly as the markets have been anticipating and is 
consistent with the publicly stated advice of expert commentators. I expect it to be well-received by the financial 
markets and by other stakeholders in the economy."  
(see  http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/news/2002/0124629.html). "The raising of the bottom of the band 
brings the overall target more in line with New Zealand's inflation outcomes in recent years and those in other 
countries." (RBNZ, 2002). As we read these lines, the first statement suggests the role of financial 
market expectations, while the second points to the importance of both domestic and foreign 
inflation developments. 
   24
Sveriges Riksbank 
The Sveriges Riksbank states in a press release to the introduction of inflation target in 1993 that 
"This objective corresponds to the current underlying rate of inflation." (Sveriges Riksbank, 1993). The only 
determinant referred to is current inflation. Recently, a more elaborate description of the target 
appeared on the Riksbank webpages. Similarly to the main arguments of optimal inflation theory 
(see Billi and Kahn, 2008), the Riksbank describes the target as the result of a trade-off between 
high volatile inflation: "Too high inflation is harmful to the economy, as inflation usually varies substantially 
when it is high." and deflationary risks: "But too low inflation is not good either. A too low inflation target 
increases the risk of deflation, that is, the general price level falls. Deflation has historically been proved to create 
problems.", also pointing out the consumer price index (CPI) bias: "There is a tendency for the CPI to 
overestimate the actual rate of increase in the general price level. This is because it is difficult to entirely exclude the 
effects of quality changes in the CPI. To avoid deflation there is thus reason to set the target at a positive figure." 
(see  http://www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10596). The Riksbank sees a 2% 
inflation target as consistent with the above arguments. 
 
Swiss National Bank 
The bank states that it takes measument error of inflation into consideration for choosing the 
target: “Measurement problems arise, for example, when the quality of goods and services improves. Such changes 
are not properly accounted for in the CPI; as a result, measured inflation tends to be slightly overstated” (see 
http://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/monpol/id/monpol_strat/6). 
 
We were unable to find the potential determinants of inflation target for other central banks. It is 
noteworthy that the Bank of Finland and Bank of Spain no longer target inflation, as they are 
now part of the euro area. Therefore, information about previous monetary policy regime is no 
longer available. Some other central banks such as the Central Bank of Colombia or South 
African Reserve Bank do not clarify how the inflation target is set, but explain the benefits of a 
low inflation environment. 
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Additional Regression Results 
 
1. Different Measure of Inflation Volatility 
 
Table A1: Determinants of Inflation Targets     
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
CPI inflation    0.50*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.49***  0.49***   0.49***
   (15.75)  (14.47)  (15.64)  (15.12)   (14.92)    (15.35) 
Inflation volatility    0.44** 0.44*** 0.45** 0.46***   0.46***    0.46*** 
   (2.51)  (2.43)  (2.54)  (2.60)   (2.61)    (2.47) 
GDP growth    0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14***  0.15***   0.15***
   (3.93)  (3.76)  (4.00)  (3.73)   (3.82)    (3.75) 
World inflation    0.12** 0.11* 0.12** 0.13**  0.12**   0.12**
   (2.15)  (1.77)  (1.96)  (2.22)   (2.02)    (2.16) 
Credibility    -0.52**  -0.53*  -0.44  -0.58**   -0.55**    -0.49 
   (-2.22)  (-1.77)  (-1.56)  (-2.26)   (-1.96)    (-1.54) 
Price level     -0.72     
     (-0.17)    
Independence     -0.50     
     (-0.98)    
Gov. party orientation     -0.07     
     (-0.67)    
(Independence + Gov. p. or.)     -0.10   
     (-0.92)  
GDP per capita      -2.29
     (-0.17)
      
Constant   0.62* 0.75* 0.56 0.65**   0.71**  0.64*
   (1.92)  (1.85)  (1.09)  (2.00)   (2.01)    (1.83)
No. of observations   134 114  123  130   134   130
Pseudo R-squared 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Panel interval random effects estimation. Inflation volatility, GDP per capita and price level coefficient 
premultiplied by 106 and 103, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period. Independence refers to the central bank independence index developed by Arnone et al. (2008). Inflation is 
not detrended for the calculation of inflation volatility. 
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Table A2: Determinants of Inflation Targets: 
Different Measures of Central Bank Independence     
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
CPI inflation    0.50*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49***  0.50***   0.49***
   (15.84)  (15.55)  (14.85)  (14.93)   (15.64)    (14.92) 
Inflation volatility    0.22** 0.22** 0.24*** 0.23**  0.45**   0.46*** 
   (2.49)  (2.43)  (2.68)  (2.60)   (2.54)    (2.61) 
GDP growth    0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***  0.16***   0.15***
   (4.15)  (3.94)  (3.71)  (3.76)   (4.00)    (3.82) 
World inflation    0.12** 0.12** 0.13** 0.13**  0.12**   0.12**
   (2.33)  (2.15)  (2.31)  (2.23)   (1.96)    (2.02) 
Credibility    -0.50**  -0.53**  -0.65**  -0.58**   -0.44    -0.55** 
   (-2.12)  (-2.13)  (-2.49)  (-2.27)   (-1.56)    (-1.96) 
Independence 1  -0.46  
(Arnone et al.  index – political part)  (-1.48)  
Independence 2    0.03  
(Arnone et al.  index – economic part)   (0.07)  
(Independence 1 + Gov. p. or.)    -0.13  
   (-1.23)  
(Independence 2 + Gov. p. or.)    -0.07  
   (-0.67)  
Independence 3     0.10  
(Guillén and Polillo index)     (0.18)   
(Independence 3 + Gov. p. or.)      -0.06
     (-0.55)
    
Constant   0.77** 0.59 0.74** 0.71**  0.56    0.71**
   (2.31)  (1.16) (2.20)  (2.03)   (1.09)    (2.01) 
No. of observations   130  130 130  130   123    123
Pseudo R-squared 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.77
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Panel interval random effects estimation. Inflation volatility, GDP per capita and price level coefficient 
premultiplied by 106 and 103, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period. Inflation is not detrended for the calculation of inflation volatility. 
 
 
   29
Table A3: Determinants of Inflation Target Band Width 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI inflation  0.03***  0.03***  0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
  (3.17) (3.04) (3.36) (3.17) (2.88) (3.04) 
Inflation volatility  0.01*  0.01*  0.01  0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
  (1.76) (1.75) (1.58) (1.69) (1.93) (1.78) 
Credibility 0.35  0.35  0.64 0.35 0.86  1.05** 
  (0.69) (0.70) (1.34) (0.66) (1.57) (1.99) 
World inflation    -0.01         
   (-0.11)        
Price level      -0.01       
     (-1.35)      
GDP  growth      0.02    
      (0.15)    
GDP  per  capita       -35.2**   
       (-2.02)   
Emerging  markets  dummy        0.91** 
        (2.13) 
        
Constant  1.70*** 1.70*** 1.93*** 1.69*** 1.93*** 1.93*** 
  (5.12) (5.16) (5.31) (4.85) (5.72) (5.72) 
Observations  139 139 124 139 139 139 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.15 0.08 0.19 0.20 
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Inflation volatility and GDP per capita coefficient premultiplied by 106. T-statistics in parentheses. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Random effects estimation. Inflation is not detrended for the 































2. Explanatory Variables Lagged by Two Periods 
 
 
Table A4: Determinants of Inflation Targets     
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)
CPI inflation    0.37***  0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***   0.36***  0.37***
   (7.92)   (7.27)  (7.99)  (7.90)  (7.90)    (7.50) (7.76) 
Inflation volatility    1.53  1.33 1.70 1.60 1.66   1.32  1.50
   (1.41)    (1.22) (1.57) (1.47) (1.51)      (1.20)   (1.38) 
GDP growth    0.18***  0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18***   0.17***  0.18***
   (6.08)   (6.01) (6.37) (5.75) (5.43)      (6.36)   (6.14) 
World inflation    0.14*  0.16** 0.14* 0.14* 0.13*   0.14*  0.14*
   (1.84)   (1.99) (1.95) (1.87) (1.83)      (1.86)   (1.86) 
Credibility    -0.33**   -0.18 -0.29*  -0.36**  -0.34*    -0.11   -0.30
   (-2.22)   (-0.97)  (-1.79)  (-2.02)  (-1.65)    (-0.48)   (-1.59) 
Price level     -0.01**  
     (-1.98)  
Independence     -0.77**  
     (-2.04)  
Gov. party orientation      -0.04  
     (-0.50)  
(Independence + Gov. p. or.)    -0.04   
     (-0.54)  
GDP per capita    -1.45 
   (-1.33) 
Emerging markets dummy     0.04
     (0.24)
    
Constant   0.57  0.87** 0.98*** 0.65** 0.64 0.71* 0.53*
   (1.36)   (2.08) (2.63) (2.00) (1.36)   (1.90) (1.25)
No. of observations   134  118 134 130  134   134  130
Pseudo R-squared 0.77  0.80 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Panel interval random effects estimation. Inflation volatility, GDP per capita and price level coefficient 
premultiplied by 106 and 103, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period. Independence refers to the central bank independence index developed by Arnone et al. (2008). Explanatory 
variables lagged by two periods. 
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Table A5: Determinants of Inflation Targets: 
Different Measures of Central Bank Independence     
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
CPI inflation    0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.37***  0.37***   0.37***
    (8.07)  (7.83)  (7.27)  (7.84)   (8.00)    (7.90)
Inflation volatility    1.42 1.75 1.71* 1.64  1.67   1.66
   (1.31)  (1.59)  (1.65)  (1.51)   (1.52)    (1.51) 
GDP growth    0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18***  0.19***   0.18***
   (6.38)  (6.31)  (4.94)  (5.81)   (5.86)    (5.43) 
World inflation    0.14** 0.14** 0.14*** 0.14*  0.13*   0.13*
   (1.96)  (1.86)  (2.60)  (1.87)   (1.76)    (1.83) 
Credibility    -0.30*  -0.28*  -0.43*  -0.37**   -0.41**    -0.34* 
   (-1.84)  (-1.77)  (-1.76)  (-2.14)   (-2.39)    (-1.65) 
Independence 1  -0.62**  
(Arnone et al.  index – political part)  (-2.34)  
Independence 2    -0.34  
(Arnone et al.  index – economic part)    (-1.38)  
(Independence 1 + Gov. p. or.)    -0.11  
   (-1.07)  
(Independence 2 + Gov. p. or.)    -0.04  
   (-0.69)  
Independence 3    - 0.45  
(Guillén and Polillo index)     (-1.06)  
(Independence 3 + Gov. p. or.)      -0.04
     (-0.54)
    
Constant   0.79** 0.82 0.67** 0.63  0.56    0.64
   (2.17)  (1.93) (2.14) (1.37)    (1.09)      (1.36) 
No. of observations   134  134 134  134  123    134 
Pseudo R-squared 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Panel interval random effects estimation. Inflation volatility, GDP per capita and price level coefficient 
premultiplied by 106 and 103, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
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Table A6: Determinants of Inflation Target Band Width 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI inflation  0.01*  0.01 0.01*  0.01* 0.01  0.01 
  (1.78) (0.19) (1.85) (1.67) (1.20) (1.62) 
Inflation volatility  0.02***  0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
  (3.85) (5.25) (3.60) (3.94) (4.20) (3.87) 
Credibility 0.17  0.13  0.33 0.19 0.84  0.90* 
  (0.33) (0.29) (0.66) (0.36) (1.50) (1.73) 
World inflation    0.01         
   (1.34)        
Price level      -0.01       
     (-0.68)      
GDP  growth      0.01    
      (0.93)    
GDP  per  capita       -46.4***   
       (-2.70)   
Emerging  markets  dummy        0.95*** 
        (2.24) 
        
Constant  1.87*** 1.88*** 1.99*** 1.84*** 2.18*** 1.13*** 
  (5.58) (6.81) (5.30) (5.39) (6.29) (2.68) 
Observations  139 139 124 139 139 139 
R-squared 0.11  0.11 0.15 0.10 0.22 0.24 
Note: * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Inflation volatility and GDP per capita coefficient premultiplied by 106. T-statistics in parentheses. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Random effects estimation. Explanatory variables lagged by two 
periods. 
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3. ‘Exact Lag’ Specification 
 
 
Table A7: Determinants of Inflation Targets     
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CPI inflation    0.40***  0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40***   0.40***  0.40***
   (13.24)   (12.91) (13.24) (12.93) (12.94)    (13.28)   (13.99) 
Inflation volatility    1.16  0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01   0.08  0.08
   (0.08)   (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.09)    (0.06)   (0.06) 
GDP growth    0.11**  0.13** 0.14** 0.11** 0.12**   0.12**  0.09*
   (2.15)   (2.34)  (2.42)  (2.12)  (2.15)    (2.20)   (1.80) 
World inflation    0.03  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03   0.03 0.04*
   (1.48)   (0.99) (1.42) (1.50) (1.43) (1.41) (1.80)
Credibility    -1.30***   -1.56***  -1.71***  -1.33***  -1.28***    -1.50***   -1.31** 
   (-3.11)   (-3.23)  (-3.14)  (-3.03)  (-2.88)    (-2.83)   (-2.54) 
Price level     -0.01  
     (-0.91)  
Independence     -1.42  
     (-1.20)  
Gov. party orientation      -0.05  
     (-0.25)  
(Independence + Gov. p. or.)    0.02   
     (0.06)  
GDP per capita    1.58 
   (0.61) 
Emerging markets dummy     0.31
     (0.71)
    
Constant   2.04***  1.69*** 3.03*** 2.06*** 2.04***    1.93*** 2.16***
   (6.05)   (2.82) (3.42) (6.01) (5.93)    (4.96)   (6.67) 
No. of observations   85  81 84 85 85   85  85
Pseudo R-squared 0.41  0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.46
Note: The lag of explanatory variables is country and time specific and is set exactly to reflect the time lag between 
the announcement of inflation target and when inflation target becomes effective. * statistically significant at the 10% 
level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at the 1% level. Panel interval random 
effects estimation. Inflation volatility, GDP per capita and price level coefficient premultiplied by 106 and 103, 
respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Independence refers to 
the central bank independence index developed by Arnone et al. (2008). 
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